Exploring Authentication for Security-Sensitive Tasks on Smart Home Voice Assistants by Ponticello, Alexander et al.
Exploring Authentication for Security-Sensitive Tasks













Smart home assistants such as Amazon Alexa and Google
Home are primarily used for day-to-day tasks like check-
ing the weather or controlling other IoT devices. Security-
sensitive use cases such as online banking and voice-
controlled door locks are already available and are expected
to become more popular in the future.
However, the current state-of-the-art authentication for
smart home assistants consists of users saying low-security
PINs aloud, which does not meet the security requirements
of security-sensitive tasks. Therefore, we explore the design
space for future authentication mechanisms.
We conducted semi-structured interviews with N = 16
Alexa-users incorporating four high-risk scenarios. Using
these scenarios, we explored perceived risks, mitigation strate-
gies, and design-aspects to create secure experiences. Among
other things, we found that participants are primarily con-
cerned about eavesdropping bystanders, do not trust voice-
based PINs, and would prefer trustworthy voice recognition.
Our results also suggest that they have context-dependent (lo-
cation and bystanders) requirements for smart home assistant
authentication. Based on our findings, we construct design rec-
ommendations to inform the design of future authentication
mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Voice-controlled smart home assistants find their way into
more households every year. Gartner estimates that, by the
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year 2025, half of the knowledge workers will use voice assis-
tants every day [10]. Currently, voice assistants offer entertain-
ment (e.g., playing music, games), information gathering (e.g.,
weather, cooking recipes), and personal planning (e.g., calen-
dar, task list). They are also a control hub for smart home IoT
devices, such as smart light bulbs or heating. However, ven-
dors already work towards new and more security-sensitive
use cases for these assistants. Voice-based online shopping
allows users to order goods without interrupting their current
activity. Compatible locking systems permit users to open
doors via voice commands [7]. Capital One, a technology-
focused bank in the U.S., uses the Amazon Alexa platform
to offer bank services such as retrieving account informa-
tion, including their current balance, or paying credit card
bills [12].
However, as Abdi et al. [2] found, security and privacy
concerns hinder user adoption of these new use cases for
voice assistants. Amazon Alexa, a widespread voice assistant
that supports online shopping, currently only offers an op-
tional voice code to authenticate users before their purchase.
This simplistic authentication method is insufficient for more
security- and privacy-critical tasks. Hence, voice assistants
need more robust protection mechanisms. Our community
already invested a significant effort in developing and im-
proving authentication mechanisms for various tools and use
cases [9, 14, 20]. However, designing authentication for voice
assistants comes with unique challenges since they usually do
not offer I/O methods beyond the voice channel. This limita-
tion makes transferring existing authentication mechanisms to
voice assistants difficult. Hence, we need device-appropriate
authentication mechanisms for voice assistants. Developing
these starts with finding all viable forms of authentication that
users trust.
In this work, we explore the design space of authentication
with voice assistants in a user-centered way. We conducted
semi-structured interviews with N = 16 participants that in-
cluded four scenarios. These scenarios depicted different sit-
uations in which the protagonists perform security-sensitive
tasks with a voice assistant. We evaluated the transcribed in-
terviews using Thematic Analysis [11] to explore the design
space. Our contribution includes findings on: (1) users’ per-
ception of threats, (2) users’ mitigation strategies in security-
sensitive circumstances, (3) users’ expectations for authen-
ticating with voice assistants, and (4) implications for the
design of future authentication mechanisms. Our results show
that users see bystanders in hearing range as a potential
threat to their security and privacy. Their main mitigation
responses focus on limiting their use of security-sensitive
features. Hence, developing alternative user-trusted authenti-
cation mechanisms is crucial to facilitate adoption of security-
sensitive use cases. The participants appreciated the low-effort
interaction with voice assistants and expected similar from au-
thentication. Voice-based biometric authentication fulfills that
criterion and was frequently suggested for authentication. In
social situations, participants reported discomfort with voice
code authentication and privacy-sensitive tasks. Hence, an
additional discreet mode for voice assistants potentially im-
proves adoption rates. Participants described that their trust in
security mechanisms builds with experience. Therefore, we
suggest that voice assistants provide a demonstration mode
for security- and privacy-related features.
2 Related Work
Our work builds on different areas of prior work: security
and privacy of smart home environments as well as voice
assistants, alternative authentication schemes for voice user
interfaces, and users’ risk perceptions and mitigation strate-
gies.
2.1 Security and Privacy of Smart Homes
Zeng et al. [39] studied users’ mental models of smart home
systems and threats. They found incomplete mental models
of how IoT devices, including voice assistants, interact with
each other and with back-end cloud services. Building upon
this work, Zeng and Roesner [40] explored users’ security and
privacy issues in a month-long in-home study. They identified
several open challenges, most importantly incorporating voice
assistants into access control systems so that they can become
effective control hubs for smart homes. In this context, they
highlight the importance of sophisticated voice-based authen-
tication, which motivates our study.
Yao et al. [37] conducted a co-design study with users
and non-users of smart home technologies to investigate their
privacy concerns and needs. They identified key design factors
for smart home privacy controls, including authentication for
multiple users and access control.
Zimmermann et al. [43] studied potential users’ mental
models of smart homes. Their participants had sparse mental
models of smart home systems, and almost all of them were
concerned about their personal data’s security.
Yao et al. [38] used three scenarios to study bystanders’ pri-
vacy perceptions in smart homes, i.e., people living in or visit-
ing smart homes where they are not primary users. Bystanders
were concerned about the video and audio data collection and
demanded privacy controls tailored to them specifically. Fur-
thermore, the authors highlight how the users’ role in smart
homes, e.g., system owners and bystanders, can strain their
relationship.
2.2 Security and Privacy of Voice Assistants
Huang et al. [18] examined privacy perceptions and coping
strategies of users sharing voice assistants. They found that
users with limited mental models did not understand how the
system shares their data with other users. In contrast, partic-
ipants with more advanced mental models were concerned
about the immature technology, e.g., voice recognition to
distinguish users. The authors highlight the need for more so-
phisticated authentication mechanisms to tackle these issues.
Lau et al. [21] conducted a diary study and interviews to
shed light on privacy perceptions and privacy-seeking behav-
iors around voice assistants. They found that voice assistant
users did not entirely understand privacy risks and frequently
traded privacy for increased convenience. Non-users were
concerned about privacy and security, partially because of
their limited trust in voice assistants’ manufacturers.
Chalhoub and Flechais [13] report similar findings from
their qualitative study exploring the effect of user experience
(UX) factors on voice assistant users’ security and privacy.
They found that common security and privacy features, such
as muting, were not user-friendly. As a response, users dis-
abled features or disconnected their devices.
Zhang et al. [41] describe the Dolphin Attack, a novel tech-
nique that utilizes ultrasonic audio signals to inject commands
into smart home voice assistants. These commands are in-
audible to humans and exploit the non-linearity property of
current microphones, which is why they treat high-frequency
sounds similar to genuine human speech. The authors by-
passed the biometric voice authentication of up-to-date smart
home voice assistants by combining this attack with users’
resampled legitimate audio snippets. Roy et al. [29] build
upon this work, extending the attack range from 1.5m to 7.6m
using an array of speakers. Sugawara et al. [34] developed an
attack called LightCommands. By exploiting a vulnerability
in micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) microphones,
this technique allows an attacker to inject commands via a
potent light source. Since these commands are transmitted
by light, attackers can inject them from afar while victims
cannot hear them. The authors report a successful command
injection over a distance of 75m with a laser beam aimed at a
Google Home device behind a glass window. Lei et al. [22]
make use of channel state information in Wi-Fi networks
to detect human presence in a room. Assuming that most
attacks happen during users’ absence, VUI systems only ac-
cept commands if someone is present at that time. Related
work identified a gap between users’ expectations of potential
threats and technically feasible attacks. Using our study, we
also want to increase our knowledge about this gap and laying
the groundwork to reduce it in the future.
2.3 Authentication for Voice User Interfaces
(VUIs)
Feng et al. [14] designed a wearable-based authentication
scheme for VUI. Their system verifies VUI commands by in-
dependently recording voice commands from skin vibrations.
Hence, this method provides continuous authentication. They
tested different designs for the wearable, such as earbuds,
necklaces, and glasses.
Blue et al. [9] proposed a similar scheme using a second
microphone-equipped device, e.g., a smartphone. By mea-
suring the direction of arrival of each voice command, their
system can detect whether the speaker is closer to the VUI
or the second microphone. Assuming that users carry their
smartphone on them during VUI interaction, the system only
deems nearby commands authentic.
Kwak et al. [20] employed machine learning to differentiate
genuine user commands from malicious input.
Zhang et al. [42] developed a system for speaker liveness
detection. By extracting features in the Doppler shifts, they
can distinguish audio generated by an artificial speaker from
a human voice. Their system enhances voice authentication
by protecting from common threats, e.g., Replay Attacks.
The presented authentication systems build upon assump-
tions about how users interact with VUIs and how they per-
ceive the system. In this work, we use qualitative methods
to explore the underlying design space, thereby laying the
groundwork for future authentication systems taking users’
security and privacy needs into account.
2.4 Users’ Risk Perceptions and Mitigation
Strategies
Several other works used methodological approaches similar
to this paper’s to investigate users’ risk perceptions and mit-
igation strategies outside of the smart home context. Many
of their findings are observable across various systems and
technologies. Hence, they potentially apply to voice assistants
as well.
Harbach et al. [16] studied Internet users’ risk awareness.
The results indicate that most of the 210 participants were
aware of general risks. The authors state that users are aware
of seven risks on average, which significantly vary across
persons, populations, and the interaction’s context. They high-
light that existing security measures often focus on technical
risks of which users are less aware. Since users have a lim-
ited compliance budget, the authors argue that they might not
adopt measures that do not directly address their perceived
relevant risks. Furthermore, the authors propose improving
risk communication and education to support the users’ risk
perception.
Ruoti et al. [30] conducted interviews with middle-aged
suburban parents about their online security posture. They
found that users weigh the trade-offs between gained secu-
rity and necessary effort when choosing security mechanisms.
Due to participants’ perception that complete security is un-
obtainable, they less frequently adopt cost-intensive coping
strategies. They identified a four-step process users pass
through where they first learn about a new security threat
(e.g., by news reports), evaluate their personal risk (ignoring
threats perceived as unlikely), estimate the damage in terms
of the effort they have to invest after a breach, and selecting
an appropriate coping strategy after weighing the costs and
benefits.
Stobert and Biddle [33] studied coping strategies that users
apply when managing passwords. They found that some of
the most prominent mitigation strategies, e.g., writing down
passwords or reusing them, seem to disregard popular security
advice. The authors argue that this behavior is not caused by
users’ insufficient risk perceptions but rather that users make
rational choices based on their personal resources.
3 Methodology
We chose semi-structured interviews building on previous
works [8, 39] to answer the following research questions:
RQ1 Which attackers and threats are users concerned about
when performing high-risk tasks via voice-controlled
assistants in a smart home environment?
RQ2 Which potential mitigation strategies do users apply to
protect themselves?
RQ3 Which properties does an authentication system for voice
assistants need such that users perceive it as secure?
3.1 Procedure
We briefed participants on the topic and purpose of the study
and how data is processed and handled. All participants signed
consent forms that permitted audio recordings. Our interview
guideline (presented in Section A) consists of three parts.
First, we asked a series of warm-up questions regarding our
participants’ general Alexa usage and experiences with the
online shopping feature.
In the second part of our interview guideline, we presented
participants with four scenarios on vignettes. These included
pictures and short textual descriptions of an interaction be-
tween a user and their smart home assistant. Prior work
showed that scenarios are a useful tool for examining users’
perceptions and mental models of a system [2, 4, 19, 36]. Vi-
gnettes allowed participants to immerse themselves into situ-
ations, which would have been more difficult using interview
questions alone. Vignettes are closer to reality than abstract
questions and might reduce social desirability bias by allow-
ing interviewers to ask questions less directly [26].
Scenarios The scenarios combined four security-sensitive
tasks with different situations. These situations vary in two
aspects: the number of bystanders and the location, namely
inside or outside the house. Most of the presented functions
are currently not available in central Europe. The scenarios
are as follows:
• Dinner. This scenario combined the task of transferring
a small amount of money during a dinner party with
friends. The use of Alexa can be convenient since the
user is sitting at a table. Several bystanders might eaves-
drop on the interaction. However, these people are, to
a certain degree, trustworthy as they are close acquain-
tances. The corresponding image shows a laid table with
several people around, chatting in a light atmosphere.
• TV. This scenario involves users and their partners. We
selected the activity of paying a reoccurring bill since
this is a typical task concerning both partners while also
being less casual and less frequent. The picture associ-
ated with this scenario depicts two people sitting in a
living room on a couch in front of a running TV.
• Door. We combined the task of unlocking the front door
with the scenario of coming back from grocery shopping.
A typical task that users perform while outside the house.
The situation includes the user carrying several bags,
making unlocking doors more difficult. This setting jus-
tifies the use of a voice-controlled smart home assistant.
No other people are immediately present in the scene.
The picture shows a person carrying bags of groceries
next to a car, a blue sky in the background indicates that
the scene takes place outside.
• Hands. We coupled the task of checking a transaction
history with gardening work, making the protagonist’s
hands dirty. We included children as potential bystanders.
We described them as running around and screaming,
meaning they do not pay immediate attention to the user
while still being present. Also, this scenario does not
feature a dialog with Amazon Alexa. In this description,
we do not refer to Alexa nor include a device in the
image to leave room for the interviewee to imagine how
an interaction could play out. At the same time, this
allows us to explore alternative interaction mechanisms,
potentially not involving Alexa.
We presented the scenarios in random order. During on-
site interviews, we presented the vignettes on printed and
laminated cards face-down to participants. For remote inter-
views, we showed participants a website that displayed four
face-down cards. In both cases, we flipped and discussed the
cards in the participants’ chosen order. Section C presents the
full vignettes that we used for the interviews. We provided
pen and paper for note-taking to participants or asked them
to send us their drawings by email during remote interviews
respectively.
After letting them read the description text and look at the
image, we asked participants which problems they think could
arise in such a situation. We did not ask about security-related
problems to avoid priming participants in a specific direc-
tion. If participants mentioned no security-related problems,
we followed up with respective questions, e.g., whether they
thought the voice code included in the scenario was useful
or not. Then, we explored threats that participants identified
and asked them to think of any other actors posing threats
and their potential mitigation strategies. We investigated what
interviewees thought might be useful to them and which miti-
gation strategies they would apply in the given scenario, with
the threats described above in mind. We repeated this pro-
cess for all four scenarios. Afterward, we asked participants
to summarize all four situations and to think about possible
similarities and differences between the scenarios, possibly
applying the insights they gained in a later scenario to an
earlier one. This recapitulation also helps to focus partici-
pants on details they might not have noticed before (e.g., the
number of people present in the scenario) and think about the
consequences introduced by said factors.
In the third and final part of our interview guideline, we in-
cluded some demographic questions, mostly used to describe
our sample. We included two standardized scales in this sec-
tion, namely the ATI scale [15] and the CFIP scale [32].
After each interview, we asked the participant about any
remaining questions, reiterated the study’s purpose, and ex-
plained why we designed the interview guideline and the
vignettes as presented. We also explained the current situation
regarding security, and most of all, authentication, on Amazon
Alexa and comparable VUIs.
Accessibility One blind Alexa user participated in our study.
We adapted our study material to ensure accessibility and ex-
changed the printed vignette cards with two separate audio
recordings: To have a clear distinction between vignette de-
scriptions and interview questions, one author, who was not
the interviewer, narrated the picture displayed on top of the
card. In a separate audio file, the narrator read the correspond-
ing text aloud. We used a computer-generated voice similar
to the one from Alexa to illustrate interactions with the voice
assistant. Providing two recordings allowed the participant to
replay each part separately.
Pilot Interviews We pilot-tested our interview guideline
with two on-site and two remote interviews. Based on the
findings, we decided how much time to allocate as well as
financial compensation. We dropped one interview question
as it was too ambiguous; we also modified the presentation
of the door vignette to clarify the scenario. We excluded the
pilot interviews from the final dataset.
3.2 Thematic Analysis
We transcribed the data at an orthographic level, including
non-verbal utterances only when we deemed them essential
for the semantic of a phrase (e.g., a participant laughing while
saying something, indicating it was a joke). Afterward, we
read and re-read the data to get an even better understanding,
taking notes of interesting details and basic patterns.
We chose to analyze our data using a thematic analysis ap-
proach, as described by Braun and Clarke [11]. We conducted
the interviews in English and German, coded the resulting
data in German, and later translated the codebook to English.
To construct a codebook, two researchers performed open
and axial coding on a subset of four interviews. First, we
performed open coding, then met to resolve disagreements
and re-coded the data. Krippendorff’s alpha was 0.50 before
and 0.94 after the discussion and re-coding step, indicating
a high agreement. Then, we performed axial coding (on the
same subset of interviews) to identify higher-level themes.
Then, another subset of four interviews was coded with a
Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.83, indicating a strong agreement
between the two coders. At this stage, the existing codebook
covered most of the data’s aspects, so we only sparingly intro-
duced new codes. Finally, one researcher coded the remaining
interviews using the codebook agreed upon in the previous
discussion.
3.3 Recruitment and Participants
We mainly recruited Alexa users because Alexa has the largest
share of the smart speaker market, and its (security-sensitive)
shopping feature is well-developed and widespread. However,
we also welcomed participants who had experience with other
types of voice assistants.
In total, we recruited 16 participants in Germany (9), Aus-
tria (6), and Italy (1); five of them via flyers around our in-
stitution’s campus, three participants over mailing lists; six
via convenience sampling; and two via snowball sampling.
We stopped recruiting new participants after we reached sat-
uration for our target population, i.e., Amazon Alexa users
from Central Europe without computer science background.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we conducted ten interviews
online and six in person at our department. We compensated
all participants with a 15 Euro Amazon voucher, which is in
line with similar studies [19, 39].
In total, we recruited seven women and nine men. Their
average age was 29.31 (σ = 10.69, median = 26.5). Four-
teen participants had at least completed high school, with
seven holding a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent), and two
holding a master’s degree (or equivalent). We also measured
the participants’ affinity for technology interaction using the
seven-point ATI scale [1]. The average ATI score was 4.1
(σ = 0.76, median = 3.83), which is above the population-
wide average of 3.5. To assess people’s privacy concerns we
used the seven-point CFIP scale [17]. The average CFIP score
was 5.76 (σ = 0.71, median = 5.93).
3.4 Ethical Considerations
Our institution’s ethical review board (ERB) reviewed and
approved our study. We followed our principle of minimizing
the collection of personally identifiable information (PII) as
far as possible. We stored and processed data in line with the
GDPR and our institution’s ethical regulations. We collected
informed consent from all participants and informed them
how we would process their data. If participants had further
questions or wished to withdraw their consent afterward, they
could use the provided contact information.
3.5 Positionality Statement and Expectations
In the spirit of constructivism, we assume that our personal
views as researchers shape every part of a study, from study
design to data analysis to reporting. Here, we want to make
our a priori expectations (similar to Krombholz et al. [19]
and Braun and Clarke [11]) transparent. We focus on the
expectations that influenced the design of the four scenarios.
We expect that the presence of bystanders (esp. considering
the familiarity between the user and the bystander), the loca-
tion in which users perform a task, and the task’s perceived
security-sensitivity (esp. considering financial risks or poten-
tial risk of a property’s physical security) are most likely to
influence the participants’ responses.
E.g., we expect users to neglect the threat of other IoT de-
vices listening in on their actions but hypothesize that they
perceive bystanders as potential risks. Furthermore, we expect
that users have incorrect assumptions about the security of
authentication methods and the kind of threats they mitigate.
Regarding mitigation strategies that users employ, we expect
to find that people refrain from using the system entirely or
only use security-critical features when bystanders are not
present. Some users might use Alexa’s whisper mode to pre-
vent other people from overhearing a sensitive conversation.
4 Results
We now present the exploratory findings of the design space
for smart home assistant authentication. When analyzing our
data, we focused on answering our research questions stated
in Section 3. This chapter is structured according to the cate-
gories we developed during the axial coding step. First, we
cover the perceptions of threats. Users were concerned about
different attackers that could affect them in the presented
scenarios. They also reflected on trust in certain groups of
people or entities. Next, we report mitigation strategies that
participants considered to protect themselves. These mitiga-
tion strategies improve our understanding of how participants
use these systems and which practices they adopt to mitigate
threats. Finally, we present essential properties for secure and
usable smart home assistant authentication we discovered
during our data analysis.
For easier readability, we refer to individual participants
with labels P1-16 throughout this section.
4.1 Concerns about Attackers and Threats
We answer RQ1 by reporting perceptions of threats and at-
tackers that users were concerned about when performing
security-sensitive tasks on a voice assistant. We found that
most users perceived bystanders as potential threats. Both
familiar (e.g., family, friends) and less familiar (e.g., neigh-
bors, casual visitors) bystanders could be present during an
interaction with Alexa, meaning that the voice code used for
authentication could be eavesdropped on by an intentional
attacker or an accidental listener.
Insiders We discovered several conflicting perceptions
about insiders as a threat. Similar to previous work [18, 24],
almost all participants agreed that they trust their friends in
general, however, we found that this does not always extend
to security- and privacy-related affairs. P7 states: “I trust
my friends, but not with my money.” Correspondingly, most
interviewees showed a more extensive amount of trust to-
wards a partner, some of them even willingly sharing their
authentication code. Others, however, expressed concerns that
a partner might become a threat if the relationship were to end
on bad terms. Previous work by Levy et al. [23] and Marques
et al. [25] suggests widespread adversarial behavior between
family members. Lastly, we found the perception that children
are a potential threat, depending on their age. P4 explains that:
“Children are usually quite bright and soak everything up like
a sponge, and I think they could use that somehow, the voice
code, to make transfers or top up their phone.”
When we asked participants about the possible motivation
of insider threat actors, they suspected that friends and chil-
dren would prank them. While such pranks usually do not
cause much harm, they present an inconvenience that most
participants prefer to avoid.
Criminals Participants also considered more serious attack-
ers such as criminals, both on- and offline, which is in line
with results of previous work [2, 16, 18, 30, 43]. In the pre-
sented scenarios, criminals could be especially motivated by
the potential high financial gains. As also reported by other
researchers [39, 43], physical access to their home proved to
be a primary and widespread protection measure within our
sample. In our specific scenarios, interviewees showed aware-
ness of several attack vectors, namely eavesdropping, Replay
Attacks, and brute-force attacks on voice codes. Participants
expected attackers to employ readily available devices such
as microphones to capture a user’s interaction with a voice
assistant. While most thought such an attack would need to
happen in situ, a few interviewees were aware of voice sam-
pling techniques using arbitrary audio of a user to produce
adversarial samples.
In the context of personal finance scenarios, participants
were concerned about remote attackers interfering with their
devices over the Internet. These attackers could exploit
Alexa’s vulnerabilities to eavesdrop on a user’s voice code or
inject malicious commands directly, in both cases bypassing
authentication. Some interviewees also suspected that attack-
ers use other IoT devices to monitor users and interfere with
voice assistants. Similarly, some were aware of malicious
skills as potential attack vector.
Untrustworthy or faulty infrastructure Due to past ex-
periences, interviewees expressed concerns about technical
issues impeding a secure interaction with Alexa. They high-
light that failures of the speech-to-text system might lead to
wrong or unauthorized commands getting executed, marking a
security breach. These findings add to results by related work,
demonstrating how unintended or miss-interpreted voice com-
mands can lead to violations of users’ privacy [24] and frus-
tration during authentication [35]. Schönherr et al. [31] found
over 1000 triggers for Amazon Alexa, Google Assistant, and
other smart home assistants in TV-shows, news, or audio-
books.
Finally, almost all users expressed privacy concerns when
it comes to sharing data with Amazon. High-risk tasks such
as money transfers can involve sensitive data that participants
were uncomfortable sharing with a company they suspected
of employing targeted advertisement or selling data to third
parties. Storing user data renders data leaks on the back-
end of the system possible, potentially due to cyberattacks.
Finally, some users also explained that Amazon or its employ-
ees might eavesdrop on a user’s voice code and use it against
their will.
4.2 Mitigation Strategies
We address RQ2 by reporting the participants’ mitigation
strategies. Users largely agreed they would refrain from using
an authentication system they perceive as insecure, especially
if they consider the use case non-essential. This matches users’
coping strategies in other contexts, e.g., online shopping or
setting up smart home systems [2, 18, 24, 39]. Our findings
suggest that users generally perceive Alexa as a luxury item
that facilitates tasks but does not enable previously unavail-
able features. Hence, using Alexa for security-sensitive tasks
is just an additional attack surface for the participants. As P4
phrases it: “I wouldn’t use any of the skills described here
because the effort- or the comfort-to-risk ratio is not prof-
itable for me.” We found, similiar to Abdi et al. [2], that users
preferred employing personal computers or smartphones as
fall-back authentication method. Mainly because users have
pre-established trust with these devices.
We found that users employ a trial-and-error strategy to
build up trust and improve their understanding of the protec-
tion provided by authentication systems. By trying out the
system under typical attacking conditions, users could gain
trust in a novel mechanism. We found a go-to attack for this
technique is mimicking a legitimate user’s voice. Users would
test voice biometric authentication by “sit[ting] in front of it
quite often and try[ing] it out while disguising my voice, to
see whether Alexa still recognizes me or not.” (P10). Most
interviewees had not used voice-based authentication before
and did not trust a system without hands-on experience. We
found that both positive past experiences and a lack of nega-
tive ones can give users a sense of security. P1 explains this
as follows: “there may be some [security] issues with the
payment method I’m currently using, but I’ve done it so often
and I’m so familiar with it that I feel safer because of that.”
We found that eavesdropping was the users’ prime concern.
Hence, interviewees presented various mitigation strategies
for this threat. The most prominent one was moving to another
room if several bystanders were present, e.g., in the scenario
“Dinner”. Huang et al. [18] reported similar user concerns and
coping mechanisms in a less security-sensitive task: making
phone calls via voice assistants. We found that there exist
specific situations in which users do not desire voice interac-
tion. Some participants stated that this was due to an awkward
feeling when talking to a computer, which can be perceived
as “admitting to being lazy” (P10) because a user does not
carry out tasks themselves, delegating them to a computer in-
stead. Furthermore, interaction over voice can draw unwanted
attention to the user. Participants expressed a desire for dis-
creet interaction options, especially for money-related tasks;
“money is always a delicate topic and you don’t want to address
that in front of everyone” (P4). Using the whisper mode of
Alexa can be a less obtrusive operation mode. Participants
also stated that this mode potentially mitigates eavesdropping.
However, this input feature was perceived as less elegant and,
consequently, not fitting into “the Alexa lifestyle” (P6).
Another mitigation strategy for eavesdropping was chang-
ing the code regularly. By doing so, participants expected that
a leaked code would no longer be valid during an attack. Sim-
ilarly, interviewees described more complex codes as hard to
remember and, therefore, also difficult for an eavesdropper to
pick-up. We found that users believed they could recognize
on-going attacks against their devices while present. P7 notes:
“Inside the house, no real sound can get through. If someone
stands in your garden and yells: ALEXA! [. . . ] then you prob-
ably hear it too.” Therefore, attacks would mainly occur while
they were away from home. In this case, participants desired
stronger than usual security measures. Our findings suggest
that users are not aware of attacks injecting inaudible voice
commands, possibly from outside the house [34, 41].
While participants did not perceive voice codes as an ade-
quate authentication mechanism for general use cases, some
interviewees talked about its positive effects. A voice code
can be an effective mitigation strategy against accidentally
executed commands since, unlike regular voice commands,
participants did not imagine saying their code in a casual
conversation. Some interviewees perceived the code as a min-
imum security mechanism protecting them from their friends’
or children’s pranks. They preferred using a code over having
no security measures. P9 explains that it “just gives another
layer of security, so my friend couldn’t just come into my house
and be like: Alexa, pay the utility bill!” Several participants
mentioned remote attackers as a concern, though none could
think about mitigation strategies against this threat. Partici-
pants did not talk about preventive measures such as keeping
systems up to date during the interviews. This observation is
in line with Anell et al.’s findings [6].
4.3 Important Properties of Authentication
Systems
We present important aspects of authentication systems for
voice assistants we identified to address RQ3. These prop-
erties showed to be crucial for users’ perception of security
when performing security-sensitive tasks.
Building Trust
Our participants’ perception of security in the context of sen-
sitive tasks on voice assistants was tightly couple with trust
in the system. This matches findings about privacy percep-
tions in shared-user settings by Huang et al. [18] those of
bystanders in smart homes by Yao et al. [38]. Participants
did not trust a new system out-of-the-box. However, they de-
scribed several ways to establish trust, especially towards an
authentication system. One reoccurring theme was that users
transferred trust from a trusted entity to a new system it sup-
ports. Interviewees named mostly banks as an example of
such an entity, but also PayPal and energy providers. Partici-
pants stated they would trust a system more if a trusted third
party provided it directly. In the words of P8: “So if it really
came from the bank, I’d trust the whole thing more, then I’d
be more inclined to use it.” Users apply past experiences to
root their trust in entities and are convinced of these entities’
interest in keeping their systems secure.
We furthermore found that participants who describe them-
selves as “old school” (P4) were skeptical of novel systems
and perceived themselves as less likely to adopt them. In-
terviewees expected younger users to have an easier time
adjusting to a new system. As P10 states: “It is not normal
for my mom to do banking on her phone. [. . . ] It will perhaps
be normal for the next generation to tell Alexa such things.”
Positive experiences with a system in the past led to a
higher trust in its security. Similarly, users could lose trust by
witnessing security incidents. Applying a trial-and-error strat-
egy to authentication can facilitate experiencing a system in a
shorter period. Similarly, users could establish trust by check-
ing other users’ reviews and ratings. Reading about other
people’s experiences can have a similar effect on users’ trust
as experiencing something first-hand. P1 notes: “If you read
that everything works, you have many people who rated this
if the reviews are consistently positive, that would certainly
build up trust.”
Transparency and Agency
Almost all participants stated that transparency is essential
when it comes to the perception of security. A transparent sys-
tem can enable users to make informed decisions when inter-
acting with such devices. Several participants noted that this
property did not transfer well from computers or smartphones
to smart home assistants. This attitude was partially due to the
fact that voice rendering is difficult to understand for users
as the underlying technical fundamentals and information-
sharing models are complex.Visual interaction enables users
to grasp information much quicker, as stated by P7: “When
I order on the PC, I have several options that I can grasp
directly and it is simply easier for me to take in with my
eyes than to listen with concentration.” This confirms Abdi
et al. [2] who found that visual interaction enables users to
absorb information more easily when shopping online.
Using a computer also conveyed a feeling of being in con-
trol, which we found is an important characteristic when it
comes to security-sensitive tasks. Our findings suggest that
using Alexa, in contrast, is perceived as surrendering agency
over to another party. Users no longer perceived themselves
as the active part and could only hope for the successful ex-
ecution of the process. They attributed this feeling to an in-
transparent control flow. P10 states: “It’s weird if I don’t see
when something happens. Because I say something and it hap-
pens. And then I just can’t understand whether it was done
correctly.”
Our results suggest that the personification of Alexa is a
potential factor for this perceived loss of agency. Interviewees
compared Alexa to a human operator and expressed that voice
commands felt like giving orders to an employee. This per-
ception entailed that Alexa could be affected by human error.
P7 explains: “Suppose I had a butler and I always had to
tell the butler: open the front door. I can’t trust that 100%
either. Clearly, somehow, there is a large basic trust. But even
then it’s kind of uncomfortable when you have in the back of
your mind: what if he didn’t do it, what if he forgot about it?”
Participants wished for a more transparent control flow, which
could lead to an improved understanding of involved entities
and task distribution within a system. Voice assistants could
accommodate for this by explicitly stating control switches
to the back end or third-party services.
Risk Assessment of Authentication
Users’ assessment of risks proved to be an important factor
in various contexts [18, 21, 30, 39]. Based on their personal
assessment, our participants derived variable requirements for
an authentication system. We identified an interaction’s loca-
tion as a major factor. Similar to Yao et al. [37], our findings
suggest that some locations call for stronger security measures.
Most participants agreed that the most distinctive difference
was between interactions occurring in a public space (e.g., in
front of the door) and those taking place in a private space
(e.g., the user’s home). Interactions in locations perceived
as secure could use weaker authentication mechanisms. P9
states: “If you’re inside the house [. . . ] I believe the voice
recognition and the code would suffice plenty.”
Some interviewees also distinguished between different
zones inside a home. Security-sensitive functionality could be
limited to more private areas such as an office or a bedroom.
P3 notes: “Transactions are only allowed from the study,
while for the device hanging in the children’s room, or in
the hallway area where everyone has access, only certain
things work there.” Another factor of the risk assessment is
being at home vs being away. In accordance with previous
work [37], our participants perceived the threat of security
breaches to be more prominent while they were away from
home. Authentication systems could follow this assessment
and apply stronger methods during the vacancy period.
Ruoti et al. [30] highlight how users weigh the perceived
risk against the effort needed to protect their privacy. Simi-
larly, we found that participants were comfortable with using
weaker authentication mechanisms, if they considered an in-
teraction to be low-risk. Several participants stated that they
would prefer having no voice code when checking transac-
tions. In contrast, most participants agreed that an authenti-
cation step should be in place to execute transactions. P14
explains: “I would be fine with using a voice code to see my
transaction history, even my account balance, [. . . ] but to
make a transaction, I don’t think Alexa should be allowed to
do that.” Some participants also expressed having different re-
quirements of protection depending on the amount of money
transferred. Low amounts could be sent without strong au-
thentication. Finally, a few participants explained that, since
absolute security did not exist, there has to be a trade-off. “It
just always depends on how much effort I want to put into it,
there will be no absolute privacy with such a system.” (P16)
Perception of Authentication Methods
We structured our participants’ insights on VUI authentication
according to the following four authentication paradigms.
Knowledge-Based Authentication Participants thought of
the voice code as a low-level barrier that could primarily
mitigate casual attacks and pranks by familiar people. Similar
to classic knowledge-based authentication, interviewees were
concerned about confusing or forgetting the voice codes for
different skills. We found that users could, therefore, revert
to code reuse, also across platforms. P9 notes: “I guarantee
you if you have the voice code to open your front door that’s
gonna be your four-digit PIN for your debit card, it could be
for plenty of things in your life.” Similarly, some participants
described they would apply coping mechanisms transferred
from passwords, e.g., modifying only the last digit between
codes. This behavior entails potentially drastic consequences
for voice code leaks as they could compromise the security of
other systems as well. One participant stated that, while the
voice code was not an acceptable authentication method for
high-risk tasks, it could serve as duress mitigation. By setting
up a code for threatening situations, a user could say that code
instead of their usual authentication code, upon which the
system would initiate an emergency routine.
Possession-Based Authentication Several participants
stated that they would favor token-based authentication with
Alexa. Tokens would not be susceptible to the openness of the
voice input channel. Hardware tokens could detect the users’
physical presence, which should match the Alexa device’s
location. A close-by token would then lead to the assumption
that a legitimate user issued the voice command. P2 gives
an example of using a smartphone as a token: “Alexa can
connect to my mobile phone, it’s in the same location as I
am communicating, then I guess it’s fine.” P9 suggested that
a microphone-equipped hardware token, such as a “Fitbit”,
could be used as an authentication token. Devices carried by
the user could be marked as trusted, which allows for weaker
authentication mechanisms.
Another way how authentication with Alexa could facilitate
smartphones would be push-notifications. Some participants
expressed that getting a notification requiring confirmation
whenever a security-sensitive voice command was executed
could be a secure authentication mechanism. Similarly, OTP
devices could replace a static voice code. In contrast, some
participants stated that using an additional device for authenti-
cation would be “defeating the point of the Alexa, being able
to talk to a virtual assistant, now that you have to involve
physical things to actually pay, so at that point, you just log
into your phone and do it.” (P9)
Biometric Authentication We found that most users pre-
ferred biometric authentication due to the natural and effort-
less interaction with them. However, interviewees expressed
concerns regarding the current state of voice recognition on
Alexa. P16 states: “It recognizes you by your voice, but this
recognition sometimes doesn’t work, and I think that’s very
rudimentary.” As some participants were aware of possible
Replay Attacks, they expected future voice biometrics to dis-
tinguish live human speech from machine emitted sounds.
Interviewees highlighted annoyance caused by false negatives
as another drawback of voice recognition. Most participants
reported past experiences where voice recognition did not
function as expected, possibly due to natural variances in a
user’s voice. P12 explains: The voice is often different, let’s
say when you have a cold, for example. Voice sounds different
in the morning than in the evening. In the context of the sce-
nario “Door”, some users also brought up face recognition
as a potential authentication mechanism used in combination
with a smart home assistant.
Multi-Factor Authentication Some participants proposed
combining some of the above-described methods to form
stronger multi-factor authentication. Participants perceived
that there is a direct relationship between more authentica-
tion factors and better security. We found that the preferred
combination of authentication methods amongst participants
is knowledge-based passcodes with voice biometrics. Other
well-known high-risk systems that employ multi-factor au-
thentication, such as bank accounts, probably influenced users’
perception.
5 Discussion and Implications for Design
We discuss our main findings (i.e., the themes we identified
during the analysis) along with our recommendations for
design. We focus on aspects that were perceived as crucial for
participants to feel protected during security-sensitive tasks.
Voice Recognition as an Intuitive and Trustworthy Au-
thentication Method
In accordance with previous work [2], our participants found
that voice recognition was the most convenient authentica-
tion mechanism for voice assistants. It was perceived as a
natural way of authentication, as it resembles the human ap-
proach to identifying a familiar person, for instance, when
talking on the phone. Complementary to known results, we
found that this also holds when users perform high-sensitive
tasks such as online-banking. Some smart home assistants cur-
rently employ a form of voice recognition to distinguish users.
However, manufacturers, such as Amazon, do not yet recom-
mend it as an authentication mechanism [5]. Participants were
aware of potential shortcomings of voice recognition that re-
searchers and developers need to address before users trust
such a system. The most prominently expected feature was
liveness detection which distinguishes human voices from
speaker playback.
Users want to Test and Experience the Effectiveness of
the Authentication Method
We observed that users initially mistrust new authentication
mechanisms they had not used before. Some users tried to
mimic other users’ voice to test voice-based authentication.
For novel biometric authentication schemes, we recommend
including a demonstration mode which participants can use
to try out the authentication process. Most state-of-the-art
systems will block access once a user reaches a threshold
of unsuccessful authentication attempts. Such systems are,
therefore, not suitable for users to test different adversarial
techniques. By including a separate sand-boxed mode that al-
lows unlimited authentication attempts, users might build trust
faster and understand novel interaction mechanisms better.
Any such demonstration mode must have the same look-and-
feel as the standard authentication process, the only difference
being that upon successfully authenticating, no real user data
is accessible. In this mode, the system should still inform
users whether their authentication attempt was successful or
not. Reynolds et al. [27] suggested a similar demonstration
mode allowing users to verify the functionality of 2FA-tokens
immediately after setup.
Users Want Unobtrusive Authentication for Social Situa-
tions
We found that participants felt uncomfortable using conspic-
uous authentication mechanisms in certain social situations.
Hence, designs of authentication mechanisms for tasks in so-
cial settings need a discreet mode. This mode would replace
the regular authentication mechanism with an unobtrusive
alternative, allowing users to perform security-sensitive tasks
without drawing attention to them. While conventional voice
recognition has shown to be a desirable option, it might not
work for settings that include several bystanders. Situations
with considerable background noise make voice recognition
inconspicuous, which, however, impedes the correct func-
tioning of the smart home assistant’s speech-to-text system,
leading to failed authentication attempts. Participants reported
having experienced such erroneous behavior before. An imple-
mentation of a new system could also automatically identify
the current social situation a user is a part of during authenti-
cation by, e.g., detecting other persons nearby or measuring
the level of background noise. The system could then dynami-
cally adapt the authentication process according to predefined
rules for different situations.
Low-Effort Interactions
We identified that effortless and straightforward user inter-
action are crucial adoption factors. Users reported that their
main reason for using a smart home assistant was the low
effort interaction with these devices, compared to computers
or smartphones. If novel authentication mechanisms diminish
the benefit of voice interaction by requiring interaction with
other devices, users were no longer willing to use them since
the perceived additional risk outweighed the benefits. Also,
participants felt that if authentication with a smart home as-
sistant required interaction with a smartphone, they could use
the smartphone to perform the task instead. Therefore, the
design of new authentication systems for use cases that are
already possible with conventional platforms has to consider
this risk-benefit analysis made by the users and reduce the
effort needed to authenticate to an adequate amount. Such
low-effort interaction could be provided by continuous authen-
tication mechanisms, as described, e.g., by Feng et al. [14].
Transparent Authentication Processes
We found that participants were unsure about the informa-
tion flow of an authentication process. Previous work [2, 38]
suggests this is also the case for the general flow of privacy-
related data in voice assistant ecosystems. In particular, which
party performed the verification of the presented authentica-
tion information in scenarios involving third parties (e.g.,
banks) was not clear to all users. While some believed Ama-
zon would authenticate the user and then get permission to
access their account, others perceived Alexa as a literal assis-
tant that takes a user’s credentials and uses them to log into
an application on the user’s behalf. Two factors reinforce the
users’ perception that Alexa uses third-party systems in the
same way a human user would: Alexa’s output does not ex-
plain whether it came from Amazon or a third party, and users
attribute human characteristics to conversational agents. To
enhance transparency and make control flow transfers from
the Alexa back-end to third-party skills easier to detect, we
propose using different voices for each subsystem. This way,
a user could instantly notice once the third-party takes over,
resolving the aforementioned uncertainty. A similar mecha-
nism to provide transparency could be having Alexa announce
handing over control to a skill and reporting back once a re-
quest has gone through. This practice could improve users’
understanding of the data flow and, consequently, result in
more informed security decisions.
Account for Varying Requirements
In line with previous work [21, 38], we found that users have
varying security and privacy requirements. In the authenti-
cation settings we studied, the two main factors were loca-
tion and bystanders. In contrast to interactions inside the
home, users were concerned about more threats for outside
scenarios. In general, users were confident that they could
detect malicious behavior from nearby bystanders. Therefore,
fewer threats were relevant for such circumstances. Also, the
security-sensitivity of the performed task affected the users’
security requirements. Most participants agreed that informa-
tion requests were less security-sensitive compared to tasks
involving money or physical access.
If the principal user was away from home, the smart home
assistant should still be accessible or remain turned on. How-
ever, security mechanisms should become more restrictive,
especially when it comes to authentication. A possible feature
accounting for these varying requirements could be a guard
mode that, if turned on, requires stronger authentication to
turn back off. A real-life example would be an alarm sys-
tem that only the correct code can disarm. A user could turn
on the guard mode if they leave the house or go to bed at
night. Upon their return, they authenticate once using a strong
and perhaps a multi-factor authentication mechanism to turn
guard mode off and switch back to the default authentication
method, which could be weaker and less intrusive.
5.1 Limitations
Our sample included almost equal numbers of men and
women. We also managed to recruit participants with a variety
of educational backgrounds. However, the age distribution
of participants skewed towards younger participants. I.e., our
study underrepresents older users of smart home assistants.
Our sample participants score slightly above average [15]
when it comes to the affinity for technology interaction (ATI).
CFIP scores indicate that our participants were highly con-
cerned about their information privacy, indicating a further po-
tential under-representation [28]. As this study is exploratory,
we targeted users who already have experience with using
Alexa. We recruited participants from Central Europe, in part
via convenience and snowball sampling. This approach pro-
vided us with a potentially limited sample of participants.
Hence, our sample might impact how our results generalize
to other users. Future work should expand the sample to in-
clude different populations, especially underrepresented user
groups, such as people with limited visual capabilities or dif-
ficulties using conventional keyboards (e.g., upper extremity
impairment). Additionally, users of other smart home assistant
systems, such as Google Home, might be worthy of further
investigation.
We designed our scenarios around a subset of security-
sensitive tasks on smart home assistants, namely online bank-
ing and smart door locks. As these tasks are currently avail-
able in certain markets, we hoped participants might have
made some experiences with them. Abdi et al. [3] identi-
fied additional security-sensitive tasks, which future work
should investigate upon, considering the different circum-
stances users might experience during the interaction. The
most noteworthy tasks, that we did not investigate in our study,
are healthcare and home surveillance, as users perceived them
as most sensitive.
Some of our scenarios, such as the “Dinner” scenario,
might not depict real-world use cases that users would want
to engage in of their own accord. We deliberately chose edge
cases for our study to provoke a stronger reaction from the par-
ticipants and get richer data. Some of our scenarios include 4-
digit PIN authentication, as this is the current standard method
on the Alexa platform. However, as other voice assistants in-
clude different default settings (see Abdi et al. [2]), future
work might benefit from investigating how these different
authentication settings impact users’ perceptions.
We cope with potential bias introduced by our personal
expectations by making our them explicit in Section 3.5.
6 Conclusion
Our interviews explored the design space of authentication for
smart home voice assistants. As security-sensitive tasks gain
traction on this platform, developers and users call for appro-
priate authentication measures that enable privacy-preserving
functionality and protect data from unauthorized access. Cur-
rently used authentication methods such as voice codes and
biometric voice recognition proved insufficient considering
both casual and targeted attackers. Prior work has already
proposed some authentication schemes. However, no previ-
ous work has investigated the requirements for authentication
systems from a users’ perspective.
We closed this gap in the literature by reporting the results
of a qualitative user study focusing on security-sensitive tasks
on Amazon Alexa. We conducted 16 semi-structured inter-
views that included four scenarios involving high-risk tasks
with Alexa users about (1) their perceptions of threats, (2)
mitigation strategies, and (3) design factors that impact secure
interaction experience. By performing a thematic analysis,
we found that users are primarily concerned about bystanders
that can eavesdrop on their interaction with Alexa. Our par-
ticipants strongly favored biometric voice recognition as they
perceived it as a natural and unobtrusive form of authentica-
tion. However, most users noted that current systems were not
satisfying their security requirements due to being vulnerable
to familiar attacks such as the Replay Attack.
Based on the insights gained from our user study, we pro-
vided design recommendations for future authentication sys-
tems. One such recommendation is based on a key finding
that users have context-dependent requirements for authen-
tication on smart home assistants. Users perceived levels of
risk depending on the location of the interaction (e.g., inside
the home vs. outside) and the type of bystanders (e.g., fam-
ily members vs. casual acquaintances). Participants valued
effortless and straightforward interaction with smart home
voice assistants. Hence, authentication methods should strictly
avoid distracting from primary tasks.
As this study is exploratory, future work can evaluate the
findings on a broader basis. Users who have difficulties using
traditional computing devices, such as users who can not read
well, or users with visual impairment, rely on smart home
voice assistants for their daily computing needs. The security
and privacy needs and perceptions of this understudied group
should be considered in future work.
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A Interview Guideline
The guideline we used for our interviews looked as follows,
note that italic text indicates actions taken by the interviewer.
Introduction
Greet participant and introduce topic: “Hi, thank you for
taking part in this interview.” Present interviewee with consent
sheet, explaining purpose of the study. “In the following, I will
ask you some questions where I’m interested in your personal
opinions and experiences, so keep in mind there are no wrong
answers. If you feel like drawing anything throughout the
interview, feel free to use this pen and paper here. Do you
have any questions?” Answer questions of interviewee, if any.
“So let’s start with the first question!”
• How long are you using Alexa already?
– Alternative: When was your first contact with
Alexa?
• What devices are you using Alexa on?
• Where are those devices usually located?
• What are some typical tasks you perform with Alexa?
• Did you ever use Alexa for online shopping?
– If yes: Did you encounter any issues while doing
so?
– If no: Where there specific reasons for you not to
use this feature?
Scenarios
Lead over to scenarios: “Thank you for your answers so far.
Now I would like you to have a look at some scenarios. For
this interview, let’s assume that all of the following features
are implemented in Alexa, even though some of them are not
currently available.”
“Now I would like you to please take one of the scenario
cards, have a look at it and read it aloud.” Let interviewee
choose a card and flip it over.
For each scenario:
• Please identify any issues that could arise in such a situ-
ation?
– Follow up: Why do you think that is problematic?
• Can you identify threats for the user in such a scenario?
• Who could be the source of such a threat?
• What would you do to protect yourself?
Transition to next scenario: “Great, let’s continue with
the next scenario. However, we can always come back to
a previous scenario if you want to add something.” Repeat
process for all four scenarios.
After all four scenarios:
• Now that you have seen all four scenarios, what do you
think they have in common?
Demographics
Conclude scenario part and retrieve demographic data:
“Thank you for the collaboration so far. Please take the tablet
and fill out the questionnaire there.” Hand tablet to intervie-
wee to complete the questionnaire.
• ATI scale [1]
• CFIP scale [17]
• How old are you? [free response]
• What is your gender? [free response]
• What is the highest education you have completed?
[Single-select]
– Elementary school
– Junior High school
– High school
– Bachelor’s degree or equivalent
– Master’s degree or equivalent
– PhD
– Other: [free response]
• How many people live in your household? [free re-
sponse]
• How many of them use Alexa? [free response]
Debriefing
• Do you have any final questions or marks you would like
to make?
Thank interviewee for their collaboration and bid farewell:
“Thank you again for your participation and have a nice day!”
B Codebook
The following list shows all codes and their categories we
used for analysis. The brackets next to the code signify the
overall number of occurrences in the interviews.
• Attackers and Threats
– Accidents as threat (49)
– Amazon listening in on conversations (8)
– Bystanders as threat (51)
– Criminals as threat (42)
– Cyberattacks as threat (40)
– Insiders as threat (39)
– Malicious skills as threat (2)
– Pranks as threat (19)
– Sharing data with Amazon undesirable (95)
• Biometric Authentication
– Annoyance of false negatives when using biomet-
rics (3)
– Authentication via voice recognition desirable (50)
– Risk of false positives when using biometrics (16)
– Uncertainty about security of voice recognition
(16)
– User wants Alexa in combination with face recog-
nition (17)
– Voice recognition should distinguish live voice
from replays (4)
• Building Trust
– Build/Lose trust through interaction experience
(51)
– Build trust in security mechanism via trial-and-
error (6)
– Trust from reviews (5)
– Trust in familiar people (41)
– Trust in system is transferred from trustworthy en-
tity (39)
• Knowledge-based Authentication
– Enter voice code via smartphone rather than Alexa
(25)
– High number of voice codes difficult to remember
and distinguish (30)
– User wishes for duress code (2)
– Voice code protects against unauthorized access
(27)
– Whispering the voice code protects against eaves-
dropping (3)
• Optimistic Authentication
– Optimistic authentication does not protect from
physical access (1)
– Optimistic authentication via delayed verification
(35)
• Perceptions of Alexa
– Insufficient mental model (17)
– Personification of Alexa (15)
– Uncertainty about security of Alexa ecosystem (22)
• Perceptions of Authentication
– Properties of authentication method are transferred
from other systems (86)
• Possessions-based Authentication
– Risk of Replay Attacks when using tokens (2)
– User wishes for Alexa in combination with OTP
(25)
– User wishes for Alexa in combination with token-
based authentication (39)
• Public Sphere of Alexa Interaction
– Openness of voice interaction security/privacy rel-
evant (85)
– Reconnaissance of Alexa easily possible (4)
• Requirements of Authentication
– Multiple users use Alexa in parallel (10)
• Risk Assessment of Alexa Authentication
– Minimal protection by law (8)
– Users notice acoustic attacks on their Alexa if they
are present (3)
– User wishes for multiple authentication steps (37)
– Variable security requirements depending on loca-
tion (42)
– Variable security requirements depending on pres-
ence of user (9)
– Weighing up risks and effort of authentication ( 65)
• Risk-Benefit Analysis of Alexa
– Alexa needs justification to exist (117)
– Refrain from using the system due to security rea-
sons (37)
– Weighing up use against increased exposure to risk
(30)
• Social Aspects of Alexa Use
– Hierarchy among Alexa users (1)
– Take time for important actions (6)
– Using Alexa means being lazy (24)
– Voice interaction inappropriate in specific social
situations (31)
• Transparency and Agency
– User wishes for agency over transparent processes
(86)
• Users’ Mitigation Strategies
– Build trust in security mechanism via trial-and-
error (6)
– Change voice code regularly (11)
– Move to another room to use Alexa (30)
– Refrain from using the system due to security rea-
sons (37)
– Take time for important actions (6)
– Users notice acoustic attacks on their Alexa if they
are present (3)
– Voice code protects against unauthorized access
(27)
– Voice interaction inappropriate in specific social
situations (31)
– Whispering the voice code protects against eaves-
dropping (3)
C Scenarios
Figure 1 shows the scenarios used in all our semi-structured in-
terviews. We printed these for in-person meetings, we showed
them on a website for online meetings, and made an audio
version that included image descriptions for a blind partici-
pant.
  
You gathered some friends for a dinner party at 
your place. In the middle of eating you remember 
that you owe Kim 20€ for the lunch she paid the 
other day. You want to settle this right away. 
You say: „Alexa, transfer 20€ to Kim!“ 
Alexa responds with: „OK, to transfer money, tell 
me your voice code!“ 
You: „My code is 8915.“ 




You are in your living room watching TV when 
your partner asks, if you have already paid the 
utility  bill this month. Since you have in fact not 
done so yet, you decided to do it right away using 
your Alexa device.
You say: “Alexa, pay the utility bill!”
Alexa answers: “OK, to pay it, tell me your code!”
You: “6858”




You have just taken all your groceries out of the 
car and are about to take them inside. The front 
door is locked. Your hands are full and you don‘t 
want to put everything down again so you ask 
Alexa to do open it for you.
You say: “Alexa, unlock the front door!”
Alexa answers: “OK, to unlock the door, tell me 
your voice code!”
You: “3071”
Alexa confirms the code and the door is unlocked.
(c) Door
  
You just came back from working in the garden. 
Your kids run around the house screaming. They 
are already very excited for the upcoming school 
trip. That‘s when the question comes to your 
mind: have you already paid for that? You want to 
check if the transaction is there in your online-
banking. 
(d) Hands
Figure 1: Scenarios used in the semi-structured interview
